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establishing the canon of the HB. It is over two decades now since this construct was 
critically evaluated and found wanting. 
This volume deserves careful consideration by both NT and LXX scholars: by the 
former, because all too often the LXX is overlooked as a link in the chain between the NT 
and the OT; by the latter, since the quotations in the NT are an important, even complex, 
witness to the ongoing development of the IXX text Also students of both disciplines as well 
as students of early church history will h d  the book beneficial. I leave the (informed) 
layperson last, because it is not easy readmg but offers much in terms of understanding how 
the question of canon was addressed, should one have the patience to persist 
Loma Linda, California BERNARD TAYLOR 
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Cornelius G. Hunter is a recent graduate of the University of Illinois Center for Biophysics 
and Computational Biology. He is also the author of Drmvn's Pmoj The Tn'uqh o@&ion over 
Science (Brazos, 2003). As an advocate of the Intelhgent Design movement, Hunter joins ranks 
with Phdlq Johnson, Michael Behe, and William Dembski. 
Hunter proposes that evolution is a reaction against a particular view of God. Thus 
evolution is a metaphysical, rather than a scientific, argument. He demonstrates this 
contention by discussing the main points of Darwin's argument for evolution, then 
shows how each of these points hinges on metaphysical arguments (chaps. 2-4). Thus, 
for him, "evolution is neither atheism in disguise nor is it merely science at work" (8). 
Hunter proposes in chapter 1 that Darwin was influenced by Milton's characterization 
of God in Parahe Lost. hlilton dealt with the problem of moral evil by btancing God from 
his creation. Darwin, Hunter contends, carried this separation of God further by making God 
unnecessary to his creation. God could not be responsible for either moral or natural evil 
because he was not directly responsible for the process of creation. Rather, natural laws 
governed the development of life and, in fact, were the source of evil. 
In chapters 2 through 4, Hunter examines the three primary evidences for Darwjn's 
evolutionary theory: comparative anatomy, mall-scale evolution, and the fossil record. He 
then examines problems with this evidence and concludes each chapter with the metaphysical 
attributes inherent in Danvin's arguments. He demonstrates that Danvin's theories were 
centered around the problem of God and providence. For instance, he notes that two 
metaphysical arguments are embedded in Darwin's understanding of comparative anatomy. 
First, God would never repeat a pattern in his creation of the speues, and second, evolution 
is proved to be true by the process of elimination. God would not create a world where evil 
exists and where there are many quandaries present among organisms; thus evolution is 
proven true on the basis of negative theology. Hunter believes that the use of such negative 
theology underlies all of evolutionary theory. 
In his discussion of Daiwin's understandmg of srnd-scale evolution, Hunter h d s  three 
metaphysical arguments. First, Darwin brought about the downfill of Linnaeus's fixity and 
essentiality of the species by legitimatizing the notion that new species are regularly created by 
unguided natural forces. A second metaphysical problem that emerged out of Darwin's small- 
scale evolutionary theory was that God is not a micromanager. It was impossible to believe 
that God would bother to create such a menagerie of different species. The third metaphysical 
problem that Hunter deals with in chapter 3 is that the "evidence for evolution incorporates 
re4yous ideas" (63). He points out that evolutionists from Darwin to the present use their 
arguments directly against the doctrine of divine creation. Thus "evolutionists' rebuttals to 
creation, though cloaked in scientific terns, are metaphysical because they hinge on one's 
doctrine of God and creation" (64). 
Finally, Hunter examines the metaphysical arguments imbedded in Darwin's 
interpretation of the fossil record. God would not have made a world with so many 
different types of species; nor would God have allowed the vast majority of these 
species to result in extinction. He contends that "evolutionists are using nonscientific 
arguments for evolution. Their arguments rely on an unspoken premise about the nature 
of God and how God would go about creating the world" (84). Thus, "some people 
fwd extinctions troubling because they focus on God's benevolence. Others can just as 
easily interpret extinctions as a result of the futility to which creation has been subject" 
(84). Therefore, he views Darwin's conclusion to be that it is "better to line species up 
in a sequence and ascribe it to natural law. If God cannot do it, then nature can. And 
the new view is so convincing because the old view is so untenable. . . . Evolution is a 
fact for the simple reason that the alternative, modemism's divine creation, is not 
considered viable" (84). The modem solution to the problem of evil and what to do 
about God's part in it, is to effectually separate God from creation and to accept 
evolutionary theory because creation is impossible. 
In chapter 5, Hunter argues that Darwin's metaphysical arguments have continued 
to the present. In his examination of five evolutionists (Joseph Le Conte [1888], H. H. 
Lane [1923], Arthur W. Lindsey [1952], Sir Gavin de Beer [1964], and Verne Grant 
[1991]) who have attempted toprove that evolution is "undeniably true," Hunter shows 
that the metaphysical foundations of evolution have remained stable since Darwin. 
Hunter believes that stability has been maintained because the popular understanding 
of God has not changed significantly from Darwin's day. Further, he contends that 
evolutionists are not responsible for this picture of God; "it was, rather, formed over 
many centuries, long before Darwin was ever born" (1 13). 
In chapter 6, Hunter then describes the belief in God that laid the foundation for 
Darwin's theory of evolution. He discusses how the attempt to explain creation 
scientifically led to the belief that God created the world through secondary means via 
natural laws. David Hume overthrew natural theology through his rejection of miracles. 
Hume believed that the principle of cause and effect excluded any "interference of 
supernatural transcendent powers and that therefore there is no 'miracle' in sense of 
the word. Such a miracle would be an event whose cause did not lie within history" (Hume, 
cited on p. 120). Thus God was placed outside of history, uninvolved and inefficient in 
regard to the development of human history. Hunter then turns to the problem of evil, 
showing that the nature of God was tirst questioned under the rubric of moral evil and 
then natural evil. The development of a theodicy became necessary for many, such as 
Leibniz, because it was felt that the actual realities found through scientific discovery were 
in conflict with popular conceptions about the character of God. Hunter contends that the 
shift in understanding that occurred in regard to creation and the problem of evil during 
this period laid the foundation for Darwin's evolutionary theory. 
In chapter 7, Hunter discusses how, "in the nineteenth century, the opinion among 
intellectuals that God was superfluous in philosophy and science grew from a minority 
position to the consensus" (127). He points to three major problems that contributed 
to the development and acceptance of evolutionary theory: rational theism, 
uniformitarianism, and the problem of evil. Rationalistic theism came as a result of a 
human-centered outlook that permeated much of nineteenth-century religious thought. 
"Amidst this milieu of relqgous thought, two important themes are discernible in the 
writings of Darwin and his fellow naturalists: Gnosticism and natural theology" (129). 
Gnosticism contended that God is separate from his creation (a trend, Hunter proposes, 
already developing in modem theology in the writings of Milton, Leibniz, and others). 
Natural theology rationalized God through the use of logical proofs for his existence. 
Uniformitarianism came out of the earlier understanding that God had created no new 
species after his initial creative act. This idea then grew into the modern notion that 
creation is stable with fixed, predictable laws. Thus when organisms with apparent 
dtsparities were found in nature, the protest was that the God of rational theism would 
not have created such a world. As scientific discoveries were made that seemed to show 
quandaries between the picture of a benevolent and loving Creator and the presence of 
natural evil, evolutionary theory began to have more presence among scholars. Darwin's 
theory of evolution was successful, Hunter proposes, because he was the fust to provide 
a scientific answer to the problem of evil. 
In chapter 8, Hunter shows the relationship of evolution to metaphysics. 
Throughout the book, Hunter builds his argument by showing that Darwin's theory 
came from a metaphysical, rather than a scientific, stimulus: the desire to separate God 
from the problem of evil and to protect God's benevolent character from the quandaries 
found in scientific discovery. In chapter 8, he specifically addresses the metaphysical 
problem. Darwin's theory, now with the scientific stamp of approval, moved from the 
minor leagues to major consensus within a relatively short period of time. However, 
Hunter contends, with every effort to separate God from creation, and even to declare 
God not only unnecessary but dead (Nietzsche), the central problem that evolutionary 
theory deals with is God. This, he affirms, is strictly against the scientific method, which 
separates metaphysics and nature, making them mutually exclusive from one another. 
Evolutionary theory, on the other hand, appeals to science to solve the metaphysical 
problem of God's existence and action in the world. To add insult to injury, Hunter 
believes, evolutionists generally refuse to acknowledge the metaphysical foundations 
upon which evolutionary theory is built. 
Hunter concludes his book with an examination of the "blind presuppositionalism" 
of evolutionary theory. Thus his task in the chapter is to examine "the various responses 
to evolution and how they can be understood in terms of their treatment of evolution's 
presuppositions" (163). He believes that it is important to understand the 
presuppositions that lie behind any theory. He notes that evolution is an interesting case 
study, "not as a model of how objective knowledge might be arrived at, but as a model 
of how subtle the use of presupposition can be" (162). Further, he contends that the 
theory of evolution "relies on the belief that God never would have created the world 
as we fmd it" (162-163). He shows how evangelicals, such as Warwick and van Til, have 
been influenced by evolution and how this influence has subsequently affected their 
theology, especially in regard to their understandings of God. Hunter's final thought is 
that "we need to understand the metaphysical interpretations that are attached to the 
scientific observations. We need to understand these things because, ultimately, 
evolution is not about the scientific details. Ultimately, evolution is about God" (175). 
Hunter's presentation in Damin's God is concise and to the point. Rather than 
wandering through unnecessary criticisms of evolutionary theory, he sticks to his main 
point and provides documentation to support his theory. His easy-to-read style makes 
the book acceptable for introductory college courses and for those without extensive 
study in the physical sciences. However, his ability to present an easy read does not 
detract from the book's scholarly potential. For all of Hunter's easy-reading style, there 
is a subtle (or perhaps, not so subtle) turning of the evolutionary argument back on 
itself. Hunter demands that evolution stick within its own self-ascribed laws of scientific 
method. Further, he makes frequent use of the Leibnizian (Aristotelean) law of 
contradiction, in which one must assume the meaning of something in order to deny it; 
otherwise the denial would be meaningless (i.e., Hunter challenges the evolutionary 
claim that God does not involve himself directly in the creative process, if indeed he 
exists at all. If one assumes that God does not exist, then one must have assumed that 
God did exist, because otherwise the notion of God would not be an issue at all). Once 
again, Hunter forces evolutionists to reexamine their arguments and to acknowledge the 
Leibnizian (and other) presuppositions that bolster their beliefs, and to move on to surer 
and (if truly scientific, less religious) foundations than those upon which evolutionary 
theory is currently based. To argue against divine creation, Hunter contends, is 
ultimately a religious, metaphysical idea. To  support it, then, with scientific evidence is 
a contradiction of scientific methodology, which clearly distinguishes between the 
metaphysical and the physical. Thus, evolution is not atheism, nor is it science. 
I recommend this book as a valuable source tool for better understanding the 
herrneneutical issues behind evolutionary theory. 
Berrien Springs, Michigan KAREN K. ABRAHAMSON 
Johnson, Phillip E. The Right Questions: Truth, Meaning and Public Debate. Downers 
Grove: InterVarsity, 2002. 191 pp. Paper, $16.00. 
Phillip Johnson, dean of the Intellgent Design (ID) movement, has been portrayed as 
leader of a nefarious conspiracy to undermine science teaching in American public schools. 
Barry Palevitz huffs that IDers like Johnson "have a strategy that would make any 
conspiracy maven drool" ("Intelligent Design Creationism: None of Your Business? Think 
Again," Evohtion 56/8 (2002): 171 8-1720). Barbara Carroll Forrest and Paul Gross have 
written a whole book "exposing" Johnson's 'Wedge strategy" complete with secret memos 
from the Discovery Institute (Evohtion and the Wedge ofInteIbgent Design: The Trojan Horse 
Strategy [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 20031). Ironically, all this hyperbole is directed 
at a movement that is transparently open in its goal to liberalize science and science 
education from constraints imposed by materialist dogma. 
There is no clandestine ID agenda and certainly no reason to search for secret memos 
by the conspirators involved; from the start Johnson has been open about the 'Wedge 
strategy." For all the details, any interested party can consult his htghly readable book The 
Wedge ofTmth: Spdtting the Founhtzons ofNaturahm (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000). If 
there is a plot and Johnson is lea- it, it is one of the most poorly concealed conspiracies in 
history. In The Right Qztestions, Johnson continues the open discussion characteristic of his 
previous writings. This is a good b g  for those interested in clear thinking about the origin 
of life, as concealing Johnson's sharpedged wisdom on this and related topics in 
conspiratorial secret memos would be a tragedy. 
The thesis of The RzghtQuestions is simple. When conttoversd topics are discussed, the 
right questions must be asked before constructive dialogue can occur. In no area of 
intellectual life is this principle truer than in the current debate over the origin of life. However, 
Johnson does not restrict his questions to quibbling details about what may or may not be at 
certain strata in the fossil record, or whether nature is capable of producing molecular 
machines. Instead, he deals with questions that his career as a professor of law at UC Berkeley 
has uniquely prepared him to address. In this book, among other subjects, he tackles the right 
questions about logic and the right questions about truth and liberty. When addressing these 
broad questions, Johnson uses his expertise as a logician and &ial lawyer to bring into sharp 
focus the issues involved and expose fuzzy thLnkLng. For most readers this will be both 
